Distilling down the issue in CLS, the Supreme court will decide whether a general purpose computer (think PC, Mac, or server) programmed to conduct financial transactions is eligible for patenting. Claim 1 (below) is exemplary of the patent claims in suit.
1. A data processing system to enable the exchangeof an obligation between parties, the systemcomprising:a data storage unit having stored therein informationabout a shadow credit record andshadow debit record for a party, independentfrom a credit record and debit record maintainedby an exchange institution; anda computer, coupled to said data storage unit, thatis configured to:(a) receive a transaction;(b) electronically adjust said shadow creditrecord and/or said shadow debit record in orderto effect an exchange obligation arisingfrom said transaction, allowing only thosetransactions that do not result in a value ofsaid shadow debit record being less than avalue of said shadow credit record; and(c) generate an instruction to said exchangeinstitution at the end of a period of time to adjustsaid credit record and/or said debit recordin accordance with the adjustment of saidshadow credit record and/or said shadow debitrecord, wherein said instruction being an irrevocable time invariant obligation placed on said exchange institution.
But we all (including the Supreme Court) have seen the exercise of determining patent subject matter eligibility before. For example, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (decimal to binary number converting programmed computer); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (updating an alarm); Diamond v. Dierh, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (curing rubber) ; Bilski v.Kappo, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010) (hedge fund business method); Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) (correlating drug metabolism); and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. ___ (2013) (isolated DNA). So what is new here to decide?
The en bank Fed. Cir. (lower court decision that is the subject of the CLS appeal), found the above claim 1 ineligible for patenting (articulated in the plurality opinion as a machine/computer/apparatus that purportedly implements an abstract financial method and subsumes the entire general abstract idea). This all sounds eerily familiar. It echoes to the past as if from the ghost of Supreme Court Justice Douglas past (Douglas being the opinion writer in Benson finding that implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, e.g. a computer, is not a patentable application of that principle).
If I were to predict the outcome in CLS, based on the most recent S.Ct. patent cases, I would say that the Supremes will (1) find the CLS computer implementing financial transactions (apparatus/data system/"machine") claims are invalid under § 101 as being abstract (per se) as subsuming the general abstract financial transaction "idea", citing Benson, and the other aforementioned S.Ct. decisions above, and (2) find the Fed. Cir. plurality opinion regarding the specific framework and/or standard for analyzing an apparatus claim for § 101 patent subject matter eligibility (i.e. extraction of the general idea of a claim and then determine whether the idea is abstract and subsumes the general idea) is not valid.
Happy Christmas!
© Stephen J. Weyer 2013
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